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Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The 1990s saw a flurry of proposals to enhance public participation in international economic 
law. There were numerous calls to make the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – more transparent and 
publicly accountable.1 In part, this was due to new awareness of globalization and the importance of 
these institutions. It was also due to diminished faith in the ability of governments to represent all 
points of view, a sentiment which made the traditionally state-centered structure of many 
organizations, including those of Bretton Woods, appear underinclusive and inadequate. 
 
 Enough time has passed for these proposals to be put into practice and it is useful, both for 
purposes of immediate comparison and longer term assessment, to examine what has happened. 
Have the initiatives truly made meaningful change? Are the actors any different than they were in the 
past? Have they really enhanced voice, and if so, whose voice? What are the pitfalls they present, 
particularly in terms of liability, conflict of interest, and the prosecution of frivolous claims? What is it 
that can be said about this trend that is unique to the economic nature of the institutions involved?  
 
It is too early to offer a definitive answer, but if a tentative one is to be offered it is that informal 
public participation – that is, meetings, symposia, and other types of consultative dialogue – have 
been moderately successful, while formal public participation – that is, on submissions made in the 
context of systems of dispute settlement – has been disappointing. The Bretton Woods institutions 
have done a reasonable job of building links with governments and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Until recently, however, they have been less successful in going beyond these traditional 
constituencies and in making contact with a wider audience in civil society.  
 
Evidence on these points is hard to obtain. On the informal side, the absolute number of 
activities is impressive. Each of the Bretton Woods institutions conducts a staggering number of 
missions, visits to headquarters, conferences and other activities designed to promote the institutions’ 
agenda.2 In some instances these are mandated3; in others they are spontaneous. What the numbers 
                                               
1 The Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 foresaw the creation of three international organizations 
to oversee international economic affairs after World War II. These eventually took shape in the form of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In April 1994 GATT was succeeded by the World Trade Organization. 
See J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System __ (1997). For criticism of, and proposals for enhanced 
participation in, the Bretton Woods institutions see D. Bradlow, Why World Bank Needs an Ombudsman, The 
Fin. Times 13 (July 14, 1993); S. Charnovitz, “Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in the World 
Trade Organization”, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 331 (1996); G. Richard Shell, “The Trade Stakeholders Model 
and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization” 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 359 (1996). 
2 The IMF now estimates that it provides approximately 300 person years of technical assistance to IMF 
member countries, up from 70 in 1970. The Fund also conducts training courses at centers in Washington, 
Vienna, Singapore and other regional and subregional locations. In June 1998 the Fund’s Executive Board 
reviewed the IMF’s approach to external communications, and in 1999 opened a new public outreach center 
and hired external consultants “to offer recommendations for improving ways in which it communicates 
information about its work to the public.” Summaries on the Fund’s external contacts are contained in its Annual 
Reports, 1998, pp. 154-155; 1999, pp. 177-179. The World Bank Annual Report for 1999 notes that whereas 
28% of Bank-sponsored projects were undertaken with NGO/civil society collaboration in the 1987-96 period, 
this has increased to 52% in 1999. See World Bank Annual Report 1999 p. 139.    
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do not reveal, however, is the quality of these contacts and the degree to which they are able to 
penetrate deeply into civil society. Anecdotal evidence suggests that representatives of these 
institutions continue to have contact with the same people, principally government and NGO figures, 
time and again, so that the process of consultation often becomes a kind of managed dialogue among 
elites rather than a forum for authentic popular expression.4 Some changes are now evident, but in 
large part the Bretton Woods institutions continue to maintain contact with “opinion leaders”.  
 
On the formal side, this tendency towards managed conversation appears even more 
pronounced. The numbers of public submissions have been small, particularly when measured 
against membership of over 100 countries covering most of the world’s population. The most 
comprehensive system of formal participation examined here, that of the World Bank Inspection 
Panel, has registered only 17 complaints against Bank projects and has proceeded with investigation 
or quasi-investigation, or kept a matter under review, in only six.5 The record among the Bank’s 
regional affiliates is even more limited. Another example, that of WTO dispute settlement, has 
received only one submission since the WTO Appellate Body’s landmark decision on public 
participation in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products6 in October 
1998.7 The WTO has yet to adopt a standard operating procedure for dealing with submissions of this 
type. Moreover, if we look at who it is that is making submissions, it is often well established non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), or entities working with them, which implies that there are 
significant barriers to direct participation by other members of the public in terms of resources, time, 
and talent.8 
 
Obviously, the way in which the foregoing is presented implies that something is wrong. 
Maybe it isn’t. In the past decade, however, each of the three Bretton Woods institutions have been 
the subject of what David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla have referred to an “NGO swarm”, that is, the 
pursuit by “amphorous groups of NGOs, linked online, descending on a target”9. The World Bank was 
                                                                                                                                                                
3 With respect to the WTO, see Art. V:2 of the WTO Agreement (“the General Council may make 
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with 
matters related to those of the WTO”); “Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-governmental 
Organizations” WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996); DSU Art. 27(3) states that “The [WTO] Secretariat shall conduct 
special training courses for interested Members concerning these dispute settlement procedures and practices 
so as to enable Members’ experts to be better informed in this regard.” See also IMF Articles of Agreement Art. 
VIII:5(c).  
4  
5 For a listing see www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel. 
6 AB-1998-4 (Oct. 12, 1998). In the Shrimp case the Appellate Body held that an individual or body 
could ask a panel established under WTO dispute settlement for permission to file a statement or a brief. See 
para. 107. It also held that a WTO member country could decide to append materials from non-governmental 
sources in their WTO submissions. See para. 109.  
7 The submission was made by two Tasmanian salmon farmers in compliance proceedings brought by 
Canada in Australia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18. Canada has alleged, 
pursuant to Art. 21.5 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), that Australia has 
failed to comply with findings made by the WTO panel and Appellate Body. As of mid-February 2000 the 
decision on Australian compliance had yet to be released. 
8  
9 “The Non-governmental Order” The Economist 20, 21 (Dec. 11, 1999). 
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the first target in the Fifty Years is Enough campaign of 1994. A similar phenomenon took place 
during the IMF Annual Meeting in April 1998. Finally it was the turn of the WTO at the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference in December 1999. In each instance, the target was publicly criticized and left 
to soul-search about what was wrong.  
 
What appears wrong, paradoxically, is that much about these institutions seemed right. In the 
1990s two of the three institutions adopted binding systems of dispute settlement; all had committed 
themselves to decision-making with a “human face”10; all had embarked on programs of outreach, 
including an electronic presence. Somehow, though, these plans and changes were not enough. I 
would ascribe this to the fact that the mechanisms of public participation were - and in some important 
aspects remain - remote. They have forged important links with NGOs, but they have not gone 
beyond. They have focused on educating public officials, but not the public itself. In short, there is not 
enough appeal to the grassroots of civil society. We don’t see the World Bank in television 
commercials, the WTO on milk cartons, the IMF in textbooks. We should. Instead, these institutions 
continue to have an elite aura, one that makes an easy target when the going gets tough. 
 
Perhaps the forms of public participation that we have now is all that could have reasonably 
hoped for in the beginning. It is public officials and NGOs that are most likely to be well-informed 
about the issues. But it would also appear that in this intensely popular age, an age when so much 
international activity appears to be increasingly democratized, we must become more concerned with 
broadening participation and with rededicating the institutions of international economic law to 
openness, transparency and fairness. In this regard we have to look to what has worked and think 
about what can be usefully adapted to other circumstances. That is the purpose of this paper. 
 
Together with enhancing participation it is clear that the Bretton Woods institutions must 
become better advocates for their own cause. At a time of increasing competition for human attention, 
these institutions must find ways to penetrate global public consciousness and convince it of the vital 
and indispensable roles they play. This is important if they are to remain at the forefront of concern 
and are not to be regarded as disposible when the political wind changes. The Bretton Woods 
institutions must therefore make an effort to become more visible in daily life, an effort that can only 
be allied with the effort toward more openness, transparency and fairness. 
 
This paper reviews the effort to enhance public participation in the three Bretton Woods 
institutions – World Bank, IMF and WTO. It goes on to make some recommendations as to how public 
participation can be enhanced based on common experience and that of other systems of 
international economic law. This is a particularly important task given that the 1990s were an 
extremely fertile decade for the creation of institutions of international economic law and that many of 
these new institutions are looking for precedent to those already established.11 The new Court of 
Justice for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in Lusaka, for instance, is 
                                               
10 J.H. Weaver & K.M. O'Keefe, “Whither Development Economics?”, 11 SAIS Rev. 113, 128-29 (1991). 
11 At least a half-dozen international judicial institutions were established, including the Central 
American Court of Justice, the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Courts of 
the European Free Trade Association and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa. 
In addition there were a variety of quasi-judicial bodies which came into being including the inspection panels of 
the World, Inter-American and Asian Development Banks, the dispute settlement system of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and its side codes, and the United Nations Compensation Commission. For a 
comprehensive list and discussion see “Symposium Issue: The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing 
Together the Puzzle” 31:4 N.Y.U. J. Int’l Law & Politics (1999). 
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self-consciously modelled on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxemburg.12 The Court of 
Justice of the Andean Community in Quito has made similar references in its jurisprudence.13 
Notwithstanding the considerable differences in role and approach, logic would suggest that if we are 
committed to enhancing public participation, then better examples may serve to motivate future 
developments. 
 
2. The Experience of Public Participation in International Economic Law 
 
a. The World Bank 
 
 The World Bank was the first of the Bretton Woods institutions to be the target of an “NGO 
swarm” and the one that has responded, in the view of several critics, best to the challenge.14 It has 
done so largely by creating formal and informal mechanisms of participation, in the process forging 
strong links with the NGO community. 
 
 The most notable of its effort has been the establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel 
in November 1993. Ibrahim Shihata has commented that the creation of the Inspection Panel was 
“driven by a broader concern that international organizations were not adequately accountable for 
their activities and by the perception that the Bank, as an important instrument of public policy in 
areas of international concern, needed to be more open and responsive.”15 The Inspection Panel 
inspired the creation of similar mechanisms in the Inter-American Development Bank in August 1994 
and Asian Development Bank in December 1995.16 To date it has been the most successful of these 
initiatives, registering complaints against 17 Bank-sponsored projects, six of which have gone ahead 
with an investigation, quasi-investigation, or are under review. The receptiveness and transparency of 
its operation could well serve as a model for other institutions.  
 
The purpose of the Bank’s inspection procedure is to provide an independent forum to private 
citizens who believe that their rights or interests have been or could be harmed by a Bank-sponsored 
project. Although it is often said that “[t]he Panel is not charged with reviewing the appropriateness of 
the policies or procedures of the Bank, but merely with ensuring that the Bank observes them”17, there 
has been a gradual trend away from a focus on strict compliance with policies and towards harm 
caused by Bank-financed projects.18 This suggests a purposive approach by the Panel to its work 
which is, at base, an attempt to resolve problems caused by Bank operations. The Panel has no 
power to declare a Bank policy or procedure invalid. 
 
                                               
12 “The COMESA Court of Justice is modelled along the lines of the European Court of Justice”. See 
“Introduction” available at www.comesa.int/court/courintr.htm. 
13  
14  
15 I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel (2nd ed.) (1999). 
16  
17  
18  
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There are three aspects to the Panel’s jurisdiction: personal (ratione personae), subject 
(ratione materiae) and temporal (ratione temporis). The Panel is to receive requests for inspection 
from an affected party in the territory of the borrowing state. A request is to be made by a “community 
of persons”, in other words by a group, association or other collectivity. A clarification to Panel 
procedures in 1996 explains that the term “community of persons” means any two or more persons 
who shared some common interests or concerns.19 The request must allege (a) that the rights or 
interests of the requesting party have been, or are likely to be, seriously affected by an act or 
omission on the part of the Bank, and; (b) the act or omission resulted from a failure on the part of the 
Bank to follow operation policies or procedures pertaining to the design, appraisal or implementation 
of a project financed by the Bank. Finally, the request must meet two temporal requirements. First, it 
may not be presented before the requesting party has taken measures to bring the issue to the 
attention of the Bank’s management, and the management’s response has proved to be 
unsatisfactory. This is the equivalent of an “exhaustion of remedies” rule. Second, the request must 
not be presented after the loan has been fully or substantially disbursed, being where 95% of the loan 
has been released.  
 
Despite their apparent formality, the procedure’s jurisdictional requirements have been liberally 
interpreted. A number of reports express the Bank Executive Directors’ “hope that the Panel process 
will not focus on “narrow technical grounds” with regard to eligibility.”20 Thus in Argentina/Paraguay – 
Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, a case involving the construction of a power dam and the 
displacement of inhabitants living in the dam’s wake, a signature campaign had been undertaken in 
the affected area. The Panel observed with respect to personal jurisdiction that: 
 
The Panel is satisfied that the Request meets the eligibility criteria set out in paragraph 12 of the 
Resolution and that those signing the Request (i) represent communities that feel negatively 
affected by the design and implementation of the Yacyretá Project; and (ii) properly authorize 
Sobrevivencia as their legitimate representative.21 
 
The jurisdiction ratione temporis requirement has not been applied stringently either. Thus in Brazil – 
Itaparica Resettlement and Irrigation Project the fact that 95% of one loan had already been disbursed 
did not prohibit further consideration of the request. The panel reasoned that there was another loan 
to be completed and that this sum only represented “the Executive Directors intended the 95% 
disbursement figure to be an indicator of completion of the project financed by the loan. In this case all 
parties agreed that the project is far from complete. Indeed, less than 50% of the irrigation works are 
complete.”22  
 
 The Panel’s procedure is straightforward. It consists of a preliminary review on admissibility of 
the Request for Inspection made by an affected constituency. Requests that fail to indicate prior 
contact with the Bank on the issue of the complaint, requests submitted by individuals or unauthorized 
representatives, correspondence not constituting a request, or frivolous, absurd or anonymous 
requests, are rejected. Where the request is likely admissible, Bank management should be notified 
                                               
19  
20  
21 While not meeting this in every aspect, “The fact that 3,000 signed the Request cannot go unnoticed. 
These people have been left uninformed and out of the design and appraisal stages of the project, including the 
environmental and re-settlement plans aimed at mitigating adverse effects on people and nature.” 
22 Brazil – Itaparica Resettlement and Irrigation Project, para. 19 (June 24, 1997). 
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and is allowed 21 days to state whether it has complied or intends to comply with applicable policies 
and procedures. The Panel can request further clarification from management or the requester. 
 
 Where the Panel is not satisfied that management is in compliance (or intends to bring itself 
into compliance) with Bank policies and procedures, it will decide whether to recommend inspection, 
after presumptively establishing the following: 
 
i) failure on the part of management to comply has caused or threatens to cause, 
a material adverse effect; 
ii) the alleged violations are of a serious character; and, 
iii) the remedial action proposed by management is inadequate. 
 
The Panel then proceeds on the basis of the request, management reaction, and its own conclusions 
to decide whether it will recommend to the Bank’s Executive Directors to pursue an inspection. The 
range of actual recommendations has covered the spectrum of possibilities, from no action to 
abandonment of the particular project. 
 
During the Panel process there are a number of ways in which the public can participate, and 
here the record has been particularly strong. Articles 50-51 of the Panel’s operating procedures 
indicate that “any member of the public may provide the Inspector(s), either directly or through the 
Executive Secretary, with supplemental information that they believe is relevant to evaluating the 
request.”23 The panel can also ask affected persons, government officials or NGO representatives to 
attend meetings and make submissions. Any member of the public can provide a Panel or inspector 
with a written document not exceeding ten pages (including summaries and appended supporting 
documents). Consultations are mandated with all interested parties.  
 
 The World Bank Inspection Panel process also benefits by maintaining an accurate electronic 
register so that there is a transparent record of what is taking place, step-by-step, in a given case. 
This is important. The global public is therefore not only treated to the final result but to the process as 
it evolves. The Bank has also posted suggested format for Inspection Requests on its website, 
together with a considerable amount of background documentation such as press releases, past 
inspection requests, panel reports, and comments by the Bank’s Executive Directors. All of these 
sources serve a “channelling function” in that they help to ensure that public input is received in a 
useful form. In a real sense, the public is encouraged to become participant. 
 
Even with this admirably inclusive system, however, there remain some surprising oversights. 
The oldest reports are apparently no longer available, at least not on the internet. Moreover there is 
no overt access. Information about the Inspection Panel remains buried in the World Bank website. 
Someone would have to know about the Inspection Panel in order to be able to access it, and the 
degree to which, to use a Bank-inspired terminology, Project Affected Persons (PAPs) are informed of 
their recourse beyond this - at the outset of a Bank-sponsored project, for instance - is difficult to 
determine. This presents the possibility of a “chicken-and-egg” scenario in which one is obliged to 
know about the Inspection Panel before accessing it. It would be interesting to study how first 
knowledge of the Panel came up in the 17 Requests made to date. The involvement of the same 
NGOs in several different Requests suggests that the Inspection Panel process has evolved into the 
preserve of NGOs working closely with the Bank.24 Again, this is not meant to imply that anything 
                                               
23  
24  
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illegal is happening, only that the range of real participants is very small and runs the risk of leading to 
a kind of “group think” about the process. Moreover, it is difficult to tell if public groups actually spend 
a long time trying to get the institution’s attention before “stumbling upon” the Inspection Panel. 
Details in one case suggest that this may occasionally happen,25 correcting the impression that 
Inspection Panel is truly accessible. It would be interesting to examine which frivolous or irrelevant 
claims have been turned away under the Bank’s screening procedures. 
 
The other cause for concern is the small number of Inspection Requests seen to date. In any 
given year the World Bank has hundreds of projects underway and disburses billions of dollars in 
related financing.26 At the risk of appearing to look for trouble where there may be none, one would 
expect more problems and more responses in a system that is truly transparent and functioning. The 
current situation suggests that, at a minimum, there is a substantial need for better knowledge of the 
system. 
 
As mentioned, parallel systems of inspection have been established by the Inter-American and 
Asian Development Banks. While these are broadly similar to the World Bank Inspection process, 
they are comparatively little used.27 In the case of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) there 
has only been one complaint to date, a companion case to one launched in the World Bank.28 It 
remains to be seen how this will be used. Information indicates that the IADB management is 
considering the introduction of modifications to the mechanism.29 There have been no complaints and 
no reports under the Asian Development Bank’s scheme thus far.30 The low usage, again, in the 
context of institutions operating in dozens of countries and disbursing billions of dollars in project-
related financing, suggests that these mechanisms are even less known and understood. 
 
 b. The International Monetary Fund 
 
 The IMF is an organization of 182 member countries established in 1946 to                                               
promote international monetary cooperation. Its main activities are the maintenance of exchange rate 
stability, promotion of economic growth, and temporary financial assistance for countries facing 
balance of payments problems. Over time there has been criticism of the Fund’s operations, 
particularly with respect to Fund “conditionality” and lack of transparency.31 The Fund does not 
                                               
25 The Desk Report done in India – Ecodevelopment Project (Nagarahole). 
26 The Bank’s Annual Report for 1999 indicates that 241 projects were approved by the Board in 1997, 
286 in 1998 and 299 in 1999. See World Bank Annual Report 1999, p. 139. 
27  
28 The IADB created an Independent Investigation Mechanism on terms similar to those of the World 
Bank, the principal difference being that the IADB Mechanism does not have a standing panel. Instead, a roster 
of panellists is maintained. See “Independent Investigation Mechanism” at www.iadb.org/cont/poli/indep.htm. In 
September 1996 a request for investigation was made with respect to the Yacyretá Hydroelectric project and 
accompanying environmental and resettlement programs. See Notice of Board of Executive Directors’ Decision 
(Nov. 13, 1997), available at site cited. 
29 P. Sands (ed.), Manual on International Courts and Tribunals 313 (1999). 
30 See www.adb.org.  
31  
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maintain any system of formal dispute settlement. Instead, the IMF’s 24 Executive Directors 
determine the course of Fund operations. 
 
 Criticism came to a head following the Asian financial crisis of late 1997 and resulting financial 
contagion in other parts of the world. The Fund’s Annual Meeting in April 1998 was a stormy one and 
the Fund has since undertaken a number of reforms, collectively referred to as the New Global 
Financial Architecture (NGFA). Despite the fact that ultimately it may not be as far reaching as 
originally foreseen, the NGFA continues to move along five parallel tracks.32 These are: 
 
i) transparency, standards and surveillance, 
ii) strengthening financial systems, 
iii) orderly integration of international financial markets, 
iv) involving the private sector in the prevention and resolution of financial crises 
and, 
v) systemic improvements. 
 
All involve some degree of opening and public engagement, but it is efforts at greater transparency 
and private sector involvement that are most relevant here. 
 
 Improving transparency within the Fund takes several forms. The Fund has, for example, 
undertaken to make available more information on IMF surveillance of countries through the release 
of Public Information Notices (PINS) following consultations. These occur pursuant to Art. IV of the 
Fund’s Articles of Agreement33 whereby member countries are required to provide information 
necessary for exchange rate surveillance and to “consult with [the Fund] on the Member’s exchange 
rate policies.” In addition, the Fund has given countries the option of permitting the voluntary release 
of Art. IV staff reports. The Fund is also to make available more information on countries’ IMF-
supported programs of economic reform. This involves actively encouraging members to publicly 
release the all-important Letters of Intent (LOIs) and Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) that they 
conclude with the Fund.34 In March/April 1999 the IMF Board agreed on a “strong presumption” that 
LOIs and PFPs would be made public, and to proceed with the release of the IMF Chairman’s periodic 
comments on the use of Fund Resources (UFRs).35 Finally, the Fund is to make available more 
information about IMF analyses of policy issues. 
 
 With respect to private sector involvement, two programs should be mentioned. The first is the 
Fund’s effort to increase public participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). 
This has involved the World Bank and other international institutions, as well as the interested public, 
in attempting to strengthen the current framework for debt relief and exploring the relationship 
between debt relief, social policies and poverty reduction. An enhancement of the consultative 
process was begun in February 1999. The second is a proposal to make available more information 
from the private sector in cooperation with the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and several 
related international groups dealing with banking, financial regulation and insurance. 
 
                                               
32  
33  
34  
35  
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 Much of the motivation for these initiatives comes from a realization that the private sector 
constitutes a potentially valuable source of indirect information on what is happening in international 
financial markets. If government information supplied to the Fund is not always accurate, the market 
can be another source of intelligence. At the time of Asian and Russian financial crises, in particular, 
there was the distinct impression that some of the problem could have been averted had private 
markets been tracked more closely.36 Under the objective of better surveillance, therefore, Fund staff 
has strengthened high frequency contacts with the private sector to monitor developments in capital 
flows and market positions, and an Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics (IATF) has 
developed a electronic presentation of creditor-side data in conjunction with the World Bank, IMF, BIS 
and OECD. 
 
 Because of its close association with the sensitive area of sovereign debt, the Fund faces a 
unique challenge in enhancing public participation in its work. On the one hand, it is seeking to extend 
the involvement of the private sector in providing information that may help to prevent and resolve 
financial crises. On the other, it must remain conscious of its role as a lender to governments, with 
often privileged information and access to government borrowers. In this sense, the flow of 
information foreseen may often be unidirectional, with little benefit for market players and therefore 
little incentive for them to cooperate.37  
  
c. The World Trade Organization 
 
 The WTO was created in April 1994 as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). It came into being at a time of rapidly emerging aspirations for public participation in 
international law. The fact that NGOs could not be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its 
meetings was contentious from the beginning. 
 
 The WTO has organized visits to headquarters, field missions, and symposia to educate the 
public about its role.38 Nevertheless, from the outset the fact that the new organization featured a 
system of binding dispute settlement and sanctions for non-compliance made NGOs and other 
members of the public anxious to become more involved. The sense of exclusion was sharpened by 
the fact that WTO dispute settlement can involve many issues apart from trade. NGOs often 
considered that they could play a useful role in informing the process on these points.  
 
WTO dispute settlement consists of a sequence of consultations between member countries, 
hearings before panels, and appeals before the WTO Appellate Body. The process is conducted 
according to rules set out in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), part of the WTO 
Agreement.39 If an infringement is found, DSU Art. 19 requires the WTO to request that the country 
concerned bring its their laws “into conformity” with the WTO Agreement. This has been interpreted as 
requiring the country to withdraw the infringing measure.40 Alternately, countries may agree to 
                                               
36  
37 Part of these very specific proposals has been to expand the IMF’s dialogue with the private sector. 
The IMF Executive Committee has considered the need to balance improved flow over international financial 
markets with the risks related to inside information. In April 1999 the Fund’s Interim Committee endorsed 
effective communications with private capital markets. 
38  
39 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).  
40  
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voluntary compensation or, as a last resort, the injured country can seek permission to suspend trade 
concessions.41 As of January 2000 the great majority of cases had been satisfactorily resolved. The 
WTO has only authorized retaliation three times in two matters.42 
At present, however, the process of dispute settlement takes place almost entirely out of public 
view. Countries will occasionally announce the decision to begin consultations, but there are few 
opportunities to learn what provisions are in issue and what arguments are being made.43 Members of 
the public are not allowed to attend hearings. The WTO maintains no on-line registry, has an internally 
generated index – the State of Play - that has been known to be inaccurate, and does not indicate the 
continuing progress of cases. On the whole the process of the system, as opposed to its results, 
remains surprisingly opaque.  
 Some change came about in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, a dispute between the United States and India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand over a 
provision of the U.S. Endangered Species Act44 which prohibited the importation of shrimp from 
countries not certified “turtle-friendly” by the U.S. State Department.45 In the course of proceedings 
before the panel in July 1997 two U.S.-based NGOs, the Center for Marine Conservation and the 
Center for International Environmental Law, submitted a brief to the panel detailing significant 
information related to the six turtle species in issue. The panel rejected consideration of the 
information, ruling that “accepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources would 
be … incompatible with the DSU as currently applied.”46 It indicated, however, that the United States 
was free to append the brief to its own submission. The United States did this and appealed the point 
before the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body then faced two issues: 
 
i) the admissibility of non-governmental materials submitted independently to panels; 
ii) the inclusion of non-governmental materials in government submissions. 
 
The Appellate Body’s interpretation turned on three considerations. First, there was the language of 
DSU Art. 13(1), which states that a panel has “the right to seek information and technical advice from 
any individual or body which it deems appropriate”. Likewise, “a panel has the discretionary authority 
either to accept and consider or reject information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a 
panel or not”. Second, the Appellate Body observed that DSU Art. 12.1 authorizes departures from 
DSU procedures and that both the Art. 12 and 13 powers allow a panel to discharge its duties under 
DSU Art. 11 to make “an objective assessment of the matter”. The Appellate Body therefore 
concluded that the word “seek” in Art. 13(1) should be read liberally, allowing NGOs to submit briefs 
                                               
41 DSU Art. 22.2. 
42 See European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
(retaliation by the United States); European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26, WT/DS48 (retaliation by Canada and the United States). 
43  
44  
45 Non-governmental organizations attempted to participate in the Bananas case at the panel level, but 
this was rejected and the point was not appealed. 
46 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, para. 7.8 
(May 15, 1998). 
 11 
with prior permission, and indicated that where material is received consultation with the parties 
should take place. 
 
 The reaction to this decision was mixed. NGOs and a number of supportive Western 
governments hailed it.47 Other countries, including the plaintiffs in the Shrimp case, were opposed, 
arguing that it impermissibly altered their rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement.48 They 
have sought a review of the ruling’s propriety in the context of ongoing DSU review.49 
 
 There are several mechanical problems with the Shrimp ruling on public participation. To begin 
with, the existing lack of transparency in the process makes it difficult to determine when a case is 
actually before a panel. It is thus hard to know when a submission should be prepared. The Appellate 
Body in the Shrimp case also suggested that requests to submit could be sent to the panel. The WTO 
does not publish a list of panel chairs, so that one cannot know with any certainty to whom one is to 
send a submission to. It would be useful, for instance, for the WTO Director-General designated one 
person – perhaps the WTO’s Director of External Relations – to act as a contact point for these 
documents and make this known on its website. More generally, it appears that the WTO needs to 
formulate a standard procedure for dealing with submissions the way that the World Bank has for the 
Inspection Panel. This could include guidelines, a suggested format, and copies of past public 
submissions. Again, all of these could be included on the WTO website. As things now stand, most 
members of the public do not know about the Shrimp ruling which, with passing time and limited use, 
recedes from view. 
 
 This observation leads to comment on actual use of public submissions in WTO dispute 
settlement. As mentioned, since October 1998 there has been one submission – by two Tasmanian 
salmon farmers. Given recent events at Seattle and the abiding interest they demonstrate, one would 
have expected a deluge of interest. Instead, the contrast between public interest and formal 
participation could hardly be more stark. The record in fact suggests that the public is very poorly 
informed and that this possibility for formal public participation is illusory. Moreover, the WTO has 
done little to publicize it. The possibility of making a submission is not mentioned on the WTO website 
nor is it referred to in WTO promotional material.  
 
 3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 The conclusion must be that in this new era of enhanced participation there remain significant 
barriers to genuine public participation in the institutions of international economic law. These threaten 
their legitimacy. What follows are a series of conclusions and recommendations to further enhance 
informal and formal participation, and to assist them in building support among a broader global 
constituency. 
 
 With respect to informal participation: 
 
a. Each of these institutions must constantly be on the lookout for opportunities to build new 
constituencies while maintaining existing ones. This will be difficult due to resource constraints, but 
                                               
47  
48  
49  
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each of these institutions must begin to reach beyond traditional networks of NGOs and build 
support at the grassroots level. 
 
b. There must be more considered use of informal contacts. Missions, visits to headquarters and 
symposia should be opportunities to meet with individuals and groups who have not been met in 
the past. The same bureaucrats and NGO officials should not be the ones automatically included 
in annual training sessions. 
 
With respect to formal participation the central problem appears to be a clash between what 
the legalization of international relations suggests to the public, with its broad notions of openness, 
access to proceedings, and the ability to meaningfully participate by way of intervention, versus the 
reality of the system we have so far developed, which is limited, hard to learn about, and unable to 
challenge the central tenets of the system. International dispute settlement is very different, legal 
though it may be. It is this dissonance of perception that is the most frustrating for members of the 
public and I think is the optic from which they approach this, and it is undoubtedly the optic through 
which they see efforts at public participation thus far, halting, slow and fundamentally inadequate. For 
this reason, I would recommend a number of improvements: 
 
a. At the pre-hearing stage, there is limited – and in many cases no – access to pleadings. 
Consciousness about what disputes are really about remains almost exclusively a state-to-state 
affair, supplemented in a few cases by a few, well-connected NGOs who may have some 
involvement in initiating the claims or access to bureaucratic channels. Members of the public are 
forced to rely on press releases and whatever is made available electronically, which is often 
interstitial and coherent only to insiders. Certain proceedings, such as those under NAFTA Ch. 11, 
are de facto entirely secret.50 It is impossible to find out anything about them unless, again, one 
has access to the relevant channels or is a direct participant. 
 
b. At the hearing stage, there is rarely public access to the hearings. The proceedings take place 
behind closed doors, well away from public scrutiny. We do not know what is said. We do not 
know how the panellists reacted. In short, this does not improve confidence in this new 
international judiciary, leaving the impression of Star Chamber-type proceedings; 
 
c. At the hearing stage as well, no transcripts are made available, and there is therefore no 
accountability. No questions can be asked. No errors can be pointed out. The systems that have 
been created do not instil faith that true justice is being done.  
 
d. Among those systems with dispute settlement on mandated timelines, such as the WTO, there is 
no indication of where a case is in the post-hearing stage. The public is left entirely uninformed of 
progress of a case or when a final decision can be expected, reinforcing the public’s sense that 
they are merely bystanders in the process. 
 
It would also be appropriate to begin identifying a set of necessary criteria for greater participation in 
international economic law. To use a popular metaphor, what would the “toolbox” consist of? At a 
minimum, in order to instil public confidence in these mechanisms the following appear necessary: 
                                               
50 This is pursuant to Art. 15 of the ICSID Rules, which state that “The deliberations of the Tribunals 
shall take place in private and shall remain secret.” Closed proceedings have occurred in several cases, 
including Ethyl. The NAFTA countries have agreed to varying rules for each with respect to the publication of 
awards. To date, no NAFTA country has made awards public. See NAFTA Annex 1137.4. See D.S. MacDonald, 
“Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for Sovereignty?” 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 281 (1998). 
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a. a visible contact point. With respect to formal participation, for instance, no institution surveyed 
here has any mention at its Internet portal. This leads to a chicken-and-egg situation: you need to 
know about the mechanism to search for it. There should be mention of opportunities for 
involvement on the first page of its internet home page, and a specific office, project or person 
should be given this responsibility. Instructions to send a submission to “the chair of the panel” are 
insufficient when one does not know whether a panel has been established. 
 
b. an accessible register. This should contain more than a skeletal outline of the case. Ideally, it 
should be set in a chronological order, and updated ever time a principal step takes place, as now 
appears to be the case with the World Bank Inspection Panel. Those responsible for information 
design should consider posting institutionally mandated deadlines as an external reference point 
as an added discipline on the system. Thus for example, where a WTO panel has 41/2 months to 
complete its deliberations and render a report in a case involving prohibited subsidies, that date 
should be posted ex ante completion of the report and visible for all to see whether the panel has 
met its mandate.51 Where it has not, an explanation should be available. 
 
c. a public dossier. As in domestic procedures, documents should be presumptively public, available 
prior to the process.  
 
d. public hearings. The very center of the proceedings must be public and in all but exceptional 
circumstances should be publicized. This now happens with in the ICJ. Consideration should be 
given to other means of making these available, through transcripts of the proceedings. 
 
 We begin to move towards a system of “open development”, that is participation by all those 
potentially affected by a case.52 This is true for computer software. There is no reason why it should 
not become possible here. There is always a fear of floodgates, but if past participation rates are 
prelude then it appears that we should not be concerned. This would do much to instil confidence in 
the system. 
 
 In summary, what we appear to have in many instances is a system of participation that has 
become a conversation between epistemic communities rather than a truly public exercise. It is the 
preserve of a group of non-governmental organizations, often with close links to the bureaucracy, 
instead of a wider forum for dialogue. This is not to suggest that any of this is inherently bad, but that 
the institutions of international economic law must recognize what has happened and look beyond for 
genuine popular support. One might fear that more “spontaneous expression” could degenerate into a 
torrent of irrelevancy, but it is important to see what actually happens. Appropriate screens can be put 
in place. 
 
Finally, with respect to building greater public support: 
 
a. Each of these institutions must review opportunities to build new links with civil society. For 
instance, regular “Town Hall” type meetings could be organized akin to the Joint Public Advisory 
                                               
51  
52 “Open development” refers to a process of creation involving individual contributions by independent 
volunteers. It is most often found in the technology context. The Economist notes that Harvard law professor, 
Laurence Lessig, has started “Open Law”, an experiment that uses online forum to draft a brief or other legal 
documents. See “The Internet: Hacker journalism” The Economist (Dec. 4, 1999).  
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Committee scheme in place under the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation53. Employees of these institutions could combine official work with opportunities to 
explain programs and receive input in civil society. Consideration could even be given to accepting 
private donations, akin to that received by the U.N. from Ted Turner, in order to build an 
independent financial base for certain activities. More internships could be offered. 
 
b. Each of these institutions must seek greater public visibility. Often, visibility is considered 
negatively by these institutions. This has to change. The institutions must realize that it is with 
visibility that they become relevant and indispensable to the broader public. One means of doing 
this would be to advertise more. 
 
c. Each of these institutions must review past work, collection and disseminate follow-up. This is 
important, and perhaps more important than is often realized. What has happened in a case after 
the formal close of proceedings is rarely tracked and publicized. All institutions of international law 
should be doing a better job of this. In the case of the WTO, for instance, national reports made to 
the DSB on compliance should be made available and under WTO de-restriction procedures are54, 
but the opaqueness of the existing WTO internet search engine makes follow-up very difficult to 
determine. There is no central repository for the achievements of these institutions. In certain 
instances results can be determined by examining annual reports, but even this information is 
interstitial. One has to have the time and patience to go back and assemble it. Hence, no idea 
remains of the considerable work that has been achieved, and ultimately, of the value of these 
institutions in context. 
 
This last suggestion is perhaps symptomatic of a larger problem in modern society, that we 
are intensely forward-looking. When a problem occurs, there is nothing to fall back on. Those who 
speak for these institutions are poorly equipped to defend them, and so we have the awkward 
situation of international organizations that are scorned, without appreciation for what they have 
accomplished. This leads to a second point, and that is that we live in an age of accountability which 
is also an age of intense competition for our attention. We must be vigilant to constantly remind the 
global public of the importance of these institutions, both through possibilities for their participation 
and through campaigns of heightened visibility. I would suggest outreach, advertising and the need for 
dialogue, not only with well-informed NGOs but with wider constituencies of the global general 
public.55 These would help to “establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”56 
                                               
53 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993). 
54  
55 R.D. Hayton, “The Matter of Public Participation” 33 Natural Resources J. 275 (Spring 1993). 
56 U.N. Charter preamble. 
